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New Constructive Trust and the Olson Case 
RECOVERY OF THE INDIRECT PROFITS 
OF WRONGFUL KILLING: THE NEW 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND THE OLSON CASE 
John D. McCamus* 
165 
The decision of Trainor J. of the British Columbia 
Supreme Court in Rosenfeldt v. Olson (1984), 20 E.T.R. 133, is 
boldly innovative. Having murdered 11 children, Clifford Olson 
agreed to provide incriminating information concerning the 
remains of his victims to the R.C.M.P. in exchange for the 
payment of money into a trust held for the benefit of his wife 
and child. No doubt legal advisors on both sides of this 
transaction had some reason to believe that its structure 
would, or at least might, prevent the application of the general 
principle that a person who wrongfully kills another will not be 
allowed to enjoy profit resulting from the act of killing. 
Nonetheless, the plaintiff parents of the victims pursued a 
claim based, in part, on this principle against Olson, his wife, 
and the two lawyers who assisted Olson in this matter, 
McNeney who agreed to act as trustee and Shantz, his defence 
counsel, who provided initial advice with respect to the 
structure of the transaction. Trainor J. ultimately held that 
the trust fund, at the time of its creation, became impressed 
with a constructive trust in favour of the plaintiffs in order to 
"remove it" from the wrongdoer Olson, from those collaborating 
with him, i.e., McN eney and Shantz, and from those whose 
claim is through him, i.e., his wife and their child. 
Although the decision is indeed innovative, it is important 
to note as a preliminary matter that it draws on two bodies of 
doctrine that are marked by a history of creative decision-
making. The first area is that surrounding the "wrongful 
killing'' principle, i.e., the principle that one ought not be 
permitted to profit from wrongful killing. The second is the 
device of the constructive trust. In common law Canada and 
in the United States, the constructive trust has demonstrated a 
remarkable capacity for evolution and growth. Before turning 
to the specifics of the problem in Olson, it will be useful to 
elaborate on these points in a brief introductory fashion. 
With the abolition of attainder and forfeiture of the 
property of criminals in the 19th century (in Canada see the 
Criminal Code, R.s.c. 1970, c. ,C-34, s. 5(1)(b)) Courts were 
confronted· with a number of situations in which application of 
the ordinary rules of private law doctrine would appear to 
permit murderers to acquire benefits as a result of their crime 
which might not otherwise be available to them. Thus, the 
* John D. McCamus is the Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School, 
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murderer may be entitled to a share in the victim's estate, 
either through the victim's will or on an intestacy. The 
murderer might be a beneficiary of an insurance policy written 
on the life of the deceased. In each of these situations, the 
Courts responded by holding that the murderer was unable to 
enjoy benefits of this kind. This required the Courts to refuse 
to apply the normal rules of contract or inheritance and, in 
the case of intestacy of course, to read a good deal into the 
provisions of intestacy statutes which are normally silent on 
this point. (See, e.g., Re Johnson, [ 1950] 1 W .w .R. 263, 57 
Man. R. 438, [1950] 2 D.L.R. 69 (Man.)) What might be 
thought to be more difficult cases arise when the killing simply 
advances the enjoyment of an existing right as where a joint 
tenant murders the co-tenant and, through the right of 
survivorship, becomes entitled to the deceased's undivided share 
of the property in question. In an Ontario case of this kind, 
Schobelt v. Barber, [1967] 1 O.R. 349, 60 D.L.R. (2d) 519, 
Moorhouse J. rejected the argument that refusal to allow the 
murderer to take the entire property "would be a further 
penalty on the survivor who has been sentenced for the crime 
of which he has already been convicted ••• and a return to 
the principle of forfeiture which has been abolished by the 
Criminal Code ••• " at pp. 353-54. The device chosen by 
Moorhouse J. for "compelling the murderer to surrender the 
profits of his crime and thus (prevent) ••• his unjust 
enrichment" at pp. 354-55 was to allow the deceased's interest 
to pass at law but to impress it with a constructive trust 
requiring the survivor to hold the interest as constructive 
trustee for the benefit of the victim's heirs and devisees. 
The tension manifest in these cases between the need to 
give meaning to the statutory abolition of attainder and 
forfeiture on the one hand, and the understandable desire on 
the other to ensure that murderers do not profit from their 
wrongdoing has led to some rather fine distinctions and to 
rather creative analysis. Schobelt is a case in point. While 
Moorhouse J. was of the view that the imposition of the 
constructive trust in the fashion he prescribed was satisfactory, 
he felt that an outright refusal to allow the property of the 
deceased to pass to the murderer at law would be inconsistent 
with the statutory policy. It will occasion no surprise that 
decisions of this kind and this problem set more generally have 
attracted considerable attention in the law reviews. See, for 
example, T.G. Youdan, "Acquisition of Property by Killing" 
(1973), 89 L.Q.R. 235; T.K. Earnshaw and P.J. Pace, "Let the 
Hand Receiving it be Ever So Chaste" (1974), 37 M.L.R. 481; 
N.M. Tarnow, "Unworthy Heirs: The Application of the Public 
Policy Rule in the Administration of Estates" (1980), 58 Can. 
Bar Rev. 582. The overwhelming impression one garners from 
a reading of the case-law is that the Courts have been very 
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willing to develop novel approaches in order to ensure that 
killers are prevented from enjoying the profits of their crime 
that might otherwise accrue to them. In this sense, at least, 
Olson is consistent with tradition. 
One final point should be made with respect to the case-
law on wrongful killing. Many observers would see this area of 
the law as manifesting an even broader principle that 
wrongdoers are not permitted to profit by their wrongs at the 
expense of others. Such observers would see a family 
resemblance between the wrongful killing cases and the case-
law on waiver of tort which permits the victim of a tort to 
recover the tortfeasor's profits, even where they exceed the 
victim's loss. (See, generally, J. Beatson, "The Nature of 
Waiver of Tort" (1979), 17 u.w.o. L. Rev. 1) The broader 
principle would also be said to be reflected in the principles 
allowing recovery of profits from faithless fiduciaries and a 
broad range of other situations in which equity intervenes to 
prevent those who engage in conduct equity views as wrongful 
from profitting thereby (such as the doctrines of undue 
influence, unconscionability, etc.). Indeed, recovery of the 
profits of wrongdoing is identified by restitution scholars as 
one of the great organizing themes of the law of res.titution. 
Accordingly, modern restitution texts will include discussion of 
the wrongful killing cases, along with accounts of waiver of 
tort, fiduciary obligation and other forms of equitable 
wrongdoing. (See, for example, R. Goff and G. Jones, The 
Law of Restitution (2nd ed., 1978); G.H.L. Fridman and J. 
McLeod, The Law of Restitution (1982)) 
The other body of doctrine on which Trainor J. relied 
might be referred to as the new constructive trust. A full 
account of the development of the constructive trust would 
necessitate a brief history of the emergence of the modern law 
of restitution. For obvious reasons, this will not be attempted 
here, but it is possible to briefly advert to these developments. 
The most important development in that history was the 
publication, in 1937, of the Restatement of Restitution. The 
organizing thesis of the Restatement was that the law of 
quasi-contract and the law of constructive trust could usefully 
be brought together and analyzed together as a coherent body 
of doctrine presenting solutions to problems of unjust 
enrichment. The traditional ideas that quasi-contracts were, in 
some sense, real contracts and that constructive trusts were, 
similarly, real trusts created the false impression in each case 
that the obligation in question arose, in part at least, from 
express or implied consent. Clear thinking about these subjects 
would be enhanced, it was argued, if they were seen to consist 
of rules imposing obligations in order to prevent an unjust 
enrichment. In the case of constructive trust, it was to be 
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properly characterized, then, not as a substantive trust, but as 
a remedial device available in some cases of unjust enrichment. 
For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the 
Restatement's analysis has established a firm foothold in the 
Canadian and U .s. case-law on quasi-contract and constructive 
trust. In addition to works previously cited, see, generally, 
J .D. McCamus, "The Restitutionary Remedy of Constructive 
Trust", in Special Lectures of the L.S.U.C.: New Developments 
in the Law of Remedies (1981), p. 85; J.L. Dewar, 11The 
Development of the Remedial Constructive Trust (1982), Can. 
Bar Rev. 265; G. Klippert, Unjust Enrichment (1983). For an 
account of American law, see G. Palmer, The Law of 
Restitution (1978)) Although the Restatement, as its title 
would suggest, was principally an attempt to restate and 
clarify existing doctrine, the promulgation of a clearer view of 
the nature of the obligations imposed in these cases has 
facilitated an extension of prior law to new factual situations. 
Thus, in Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 8 E.T.R. 143, 
19 R.F.L. (2d) 165, 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257, 34 N.R. 384, the 
Supreme Court of Canada not only adopted the Restatement's 
view of the remedial nature of the constructive trust, but 
applied it in a novel way to ensure that separating _spouses 
fairly divided properties which were accumulated as a result ~f 
their joint effort. Schobelt v. Barber, referred to above, is 
another illustration of the willingness of Courts to adopt this 
device in new circumstances but, more generally, it should be 
noted that the principal difference between North American 
and English case-law on "wrongful killing", is the willingness of 
Canadian and U.S. Courts to use the constructive trust in this 
context in order to prevent unjust enrichment of the killer. 
Thus, in drawing on the resources of the new constructive trust 
in the Olson case, Trainor J. was working within an area of 
doctrine marked by an unusual degree of elasticity. 
If novelty, per se, is unexceptionable in these 
circumstances, we must nonetheless ask whether the extension 
of prior law in Olson is soundly based. A number of 
interesting issues arise. First, it must be asked whether, as a 
general matter, it is sensible to extend the application of the 
wrongful killing rule . to what might be referred to as indirect 
or incidental benefits of the kind at issue here. More 
particularly, should payments made in aid of a criminal 
investigation be recoverable? Should the type of recovery 
allowed in Olson be extended to such items as royalties earned 
by the killer from books recounting his misdeeds? What was 
the significance, if any, of the fact that the moneys were 
settled in a trust for Olson's wife? Why is it that the parents 
should be considered entitled to make this particular claim? 
Each of these issues will be discussed in turn. 
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Direct v. Indirect Benefits of Wrongful Killing 
In all previous cases in which recovery on the basis of 
the wrongful killing principle has been allowed, the benefit 
accrued to the murderer was simply, or one might say directly, 
as a result of the killing. That is to say, on the basis of a 
pre-existing state of legal affairs, be it a will, insurance 
contract or a joint tenancy, the fact of the victim's death 
gave rise to the enjoyment of a benefit. In Olson, on the 
other hand, the commission of the crimes did, of course, 
provide the opportunity for securing the benefit in question, 
but it clearly resulted from subsequent conduct in the form of 
negotiations with the R.C.M.P. and the entering into of an 
agreement to establish a trust fund. Royalties would be 
another case in point. The crime provides the opportunity for 
profit but subsequent and different activity is required to 
actually generate the profit. 
The extension of the rule to indirect profits of this kind 
might be attacked on a number of grounds. First, it might be 
suggested that the disabling of a criminal from generating 
profit by subsequent and different conduct conflicts with the 
policies underlying the abolition of attainder and forfeiture and, 
indeed, that the recovery of indirect profits more obviously 
conflicts with these policies than the recovery of direct 
profits. As a result . of the crime, a civil incapacity to enter 
into subsequent arrangements of certain kinds is imposed. 
On the contrary, however, it would appear that the 
recovery of indirect profits is no greater an incursion on the 
capacity of the criminal than the recovery of direct profits. 
It is not at all obvious that it is more offensive to strike down 
existing arrangements such as wills and insurance contracts 
than to prevent the criminal from exploiting, in a particular 
way, an opportunity for profit which arises only because of the 
criminal's wrongdoing. Indeed, it might be felt that a rule 
which attacks profits of the latter kind is more closely linked 
to the rationale of the wrongful killing rule than cases like 
Schobelt v. Barber. 
Another objection to the extension to indirect benefits 
might be that the causal link between the killing and the 
profit is broken in such cases and that the chain of causation 
present in cases of direct profit is essential to the argument 
that recovery in such cases does not undermine the anti-
forfeiture principle. Again, however, there is a persuasive 
argument to the contrary. In cases of direct benefit, it is not 
true that the killing is in some sense an independent cause of 
the profit. In each case there is a pre-existing legal 
arrangement or entitlement which is simply triggered by the 
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death of the victim. It is not essential to recovery in such 
cases that the killing be part of an elaborate scheme to 
acquire the benefit in question. 
As a matter of general principle, then, there appears to 
be no reason for an absolute preclusion of the recovery of 
indirect benefits. When one considers the particular cases. of 
payments made to secure incriminating evi~en:e and royal~ies 
from autobiographical accounts of criminal wrongdoing, 
however, more particular objections to recovery emerge. 
Payments in Aid of Investigation 
The principal objection to the granting o~ recover~ of the 
payment made in Olson is that a rule which permits. s.uch 
recovery has the effect of disabling law e!1force.ment . off!cia~s 
from using this particular device as an aid to investigation m 
the future. If one accepts, as did Trainor J., that the case 
against Olson was otherwi~e rat~er. "thin" and its s~ccessful 
prosecution was therefore unllkely, it is not at all obvious. that 
it would be in the public interest to refuse to barter with a 
criminal in this fashion. Certainly, it may be seriously 
questioned whether it would not be more desirable to. l~ave the 
difficult policy choice to senior law enforcement officials and 
the political process rather than the judiciary. In Olson, the 
payment was ultimate!~ approv~d by the .Attor~ey .General ~f 
British Columbia and, mdeed, it was Trainor J. s view that his 
handling of the matter was beyond reproach (Reasons, p. 136). 
The decision to make the payment was obviously a difficult 
one, involving a balancing of a number of po~icy consideratio!18· 
Where the decision has been made responsibly and at a high 
and politically accountable level, there is much to be s~id for 
a judicial reluctance to interve!le in. sue~ a way as to virtually 
preclude the exercise of such discretion m the future. 
Further it should be noted that the potential scope of 
the Olson de~ision is considerable. As Trainor J. indicated, 
"Experience has shown that it i~ often necessary in .order to 
secure evidence and to solve crimes for peace officer~ . to 
protect or assist witnesses or their dependents by prov1dmg 
maintenance, relocation and other expenses, change of 
identities and safe accommodation" (Reasons,. P: 137) •. Many 
of these "witnesses" will, of course, be participants m th.e 
crime in question who may or may not have excha~ged their 
willingness to testify for an .immuni~y !rom prosecution. All 
such recipients are potentially withm the scope of the new 
rule. If one assumes, as Trainor J. does, that the Crown must 
be permitted to confer benefits of this. kind on wrongdoers, 
how is one to distinguish from these benefits, payments of the 
kind made in the Olson case? 
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Trainor J. attempted to distinguish permissible conferrals 
such as maintenance and relocation costs from the Olson 
payment in the following fashion. "The line drawn over the 
years is that a wrongdoer should not benefit from his crime. 
There is a rule of public policy, said to be an integral part of 
our law, which precludes a person benefitting from his own 
crime" (Reasons, p. 138). This appears to be an attempt to 
distinguish "profits" in some sense from benefits which merely 
insulate the wrongdoer from the negative consequences that 
would otherwise flow from his detection or from his known 
willingness to testify at the trials of others, i.e., from benefits 
which, in some sense, merely preserve the status quo. 
The suggested distinction is not entirely convincing. The 
provision of these "necessaries" may be much more valuable to 
the recipient than a lump sum payment and, indeed, a much 
more expensive matter for the Crown. Further, to the extent 
that maintenance costs are supplied in the form of what is in 
effect a salary, any savings generated would appear to be 
indistinguishable from the payment made in the Olson case. 
No doubt some would view a generitt attack on the ability 
of the Crown to provide benefits of this kind to criminal 
wrongdoers as desirable. There may be some feeling that the 
provision of such benefits will too easily become a substitute 
for more effective investigation by the Crown. This, however, 
is a problem inherent in the general use of paid informants and 
is not peculiar to the case of informants who are also 
participants in a crime. We appear to be satisfied, as a 
general matter, to allow law enforcement officials a discretion 
to determine when the use of paid informants is an 
investigative device that must be used in the particular case. 
Certainly the Supreme Court of Canada is supportive of the 
use of informers. See, e.g., Bissaillon v. Keable, [1983] 2 
S.C.R. 60, 4 Admin. L.R. 205, 37 C.R. (3d) 289, 7 C.C.C. (3d) 
385, 2 D.L.R. (4th) 193. There would be no reason to have 
less confidence in the exercise of this discretion in dealings 
with participants. 
Nor would it be realistic to oppose payments to 
participants on the ground that a practice of this kind might 
create an incentive to criminal misconduct. There is, however, 
a chilling passage in the Olson judgment in which Trainor J. 
describes an attempt by Olson, at an early point in the 
investigation of the killings, to be hired by the R.C.M.P. as an 
informant at a salary of $3,000 per month. The R.C.M.P. 
denied the request. Later that same day, Olson murdered 
another child (Reasons, p. 139). Perhaps it is possible that 
there are individuals so disturbed they might commit crimes 
with a view to providing a demand for their services as 
informants, or in order to provide an opportunity to secure 
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other kinds of benefits. As a more general matter, however, 
the circumstances in which such benefits can be negotiated are 
so rare and precarious that it seems unlikely that the 
occasional conferral of such benefits would create any 
meaningful incentive to criminal conduct. 
In short, the holding in Olson, insofar as it constrains the 
ability of the Crown to utilize the provision of benefits as an 
investigative device, may be undesirable on policy grounds. 
Perhaps one could identify lump sum payments to participants 
as especially offensive, and therefore recoverable. The 
preferable view, it is submitted, is that the ability of the 
Crown to utilize this device, at least in cases where its use 
has the approval of the senior law officer of the Crown, should 
not be undermined by a general rule permitting subsequent 
recovery of the payment. This is not to say, however, that 
there may not be some attraction to a rule which would 
permit recovery where the circumstances or amount of the 
payment are such as to shock the conscience of the Court. It 
might indeed be helpful to the Crown to bargain in the shadow 
of such a rule. In the particular case of payments to 
witnesses, the Crown is. constrained to make reasonable 
arrangements, of course, by the need to avoid any impression 
that the witness has been bribed. See Palmer v. R., [1980] 1 
S.C.R. 759, 14 C.R. (3d) 22, 17 C.R. (3d) 34, 50 C.C.C. (2d) 
194, 106 D.L.R. (3D) 212 at 228 (sub nom. R. v. Palmer), 30 
N.R. 1~1 (S.C.C.): . A more ge1?-eral rule of the kind suggested 
would impose a similar constramt on payments to criminals 
who will not be testifying. Further, it might well be desirable 
to permit the Crown itself to assert a more generalized cause 
of action in cases of this kind. We will return to this point 
below. 
Royalties. 
Lump sum payments of the kind made in Olson are, of 
course, likely to be rare. A more obvious target of a rule 
permitting the recovery of indirect profits would be royalties 
and other compensation earned by criminals for the publication 
of personal accounts of their misdeeds. In Olson itself 
reference is made by Trainor J. to legal costs absorbed in th~ 
negotiation of a publication agreement. There does not appear 
to be any principled basis set forth in the Olson analysis that 
would preclude recovery of indirect profits of this kind. 
In the United States, the understandable concern felt by 
many at the prospect of handsome profits of this kind has led 
to the enactment of statutes in a number of states that make 
available to victims the money earned by criminals from the 
re-enactment of their crimes, whether through the writing amd 
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publication of a book or through any other medium of 
communication or entertainment. (See, generally, S. Clark, 
"The Son-of-Sam Laws: When the Lunatic, the Criminal, the 
Poet are of Imagination All Compact" (1983), St. Louis U.L.J. 
207 .) The Olson case might very well be taken to establish a 
common law basis for similar claims and again, therefore, it 
must be asked whether a recovery of this kind is soundly based 
in public policy. 
It will occasion no surprise that some observers are of 
the view that the U.S. statutory schemes are of dubious 
constitutional validity. One would expect that a statute which 
removes incentives to the publication of views would be 
vulnerable on First Amendment grounds. Nonetheless, there 
does not yet appear to have been a successful constitutional 
challenge to any of the U.S. statutes. No doubt a Canadian 
statute would be subject to similar scrutiny under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Leaving aside the technical question of the 
constitutionality of such statutes and the question of the 
impact of unconstitutionality upon the capacity of the Courts 
to permit analagous relief at common law, it is obvious that a 
persuasive argument can be made against recovery of this kind 
on policy grounds. As a general matter, the publication of 
such works is desirable for a number of reasons. They may 
communicate ideas and information to the public that will 
inform debate on important questions. They may provide 
information that law enforcement agencies and criminologists 
would find useful in combatting or studying crime. They may 
have the effect of discouraging others from engaging in 
criminal conduct. They may have literary or other artistic or 
cultural value. The process of creation may have a 
rehabilitative effect on their authors. The fact that any 
particular work fails to accomplish any or all of these 
objectives is not a reason for discouraging publication of the 
entire genre. Accordingly, a rule which removes any incentive 
for publication may be thought undesirable on policy grounds. 
It may be answered that there are other motivations for 
creating works of this kind, and that the removal of financial 
incentives will therefore not seriously restrict the flow of this 
sort of material. No doubt this might be true in many cases, 
but as a general matter, it seems likely that the motivation of 
personal profit must play an important role in encouraging the 
production of such works. Nonetheless, as the enactment of 
legislation in the United States indicates, there is considerable 
public sentiment against allowing profits of this kind. 
An intermediate solution that might satisfactorily 
reconcile the conflicting interests in encouraging publication 
and removing profits would be to permit criminals to enjoy 
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modest rewards for activity of this kind. Thus, a statutory 
scheme could set a maximum on the level of compensation to 
be enjoyed from these projects. Such a provision might 
buttress the statute from constitutional attack although, no 
doubt, it would also bring with it a number of difficulties of 
definition and implementation. A similar approach could be 
taken at common law by allowing recovery only of profits that 
are in excess of the level of compensation normally available 
to published authors or, perhaps, a reasonable quantum meruit 
for the service rendered in creating the work. In the absence 
of a solution of this kind, it may be that the preferable 
solution is to deny victims the right to pursue these profits 
with a constructive trust and leave them to assert such other 
civil remedies as may be available against the criminal author. 
The Significance of the Trust 
An interesting issue which surfaced in Olson was whether 
the payment of the moneys into a trust fund for the benefit of 
Olson's wife and child would preclude application of the 
wrongful killing principle. Obviously, it was the view of 
Olson's counsel that this might ·be the case. Clearly, Trainor 
J. was troubled by this point as well, as it attracted much 
attention in his reasons for judgment. 
It is important to note the narrowness of the holding in 
Olson on this point. It was Trainor J .'s view that the 
circumstances and manner of the creation of the trust were 
not such as to support an argument of this kind on behalf of 
the defendants. More particularly, the fact that at the time 
of its creation, Olson and his lawyer were making certain 
arrangements for the disposition of some portion of the trust 
moneys, together with the fact that Olson obviously influenced 
subsequent use of the moneys, led Trainor J. to conclude that 
the fund was not established in such a way as to place the 
moneys beyond his dominion and control. 
It was thus unnecessary for Trainor J. to determine what 
the effect of the trust would have been if it had been properly 
created and implemented. Nonetheless, he ultimately concluded 
that the device would likely be unsuccessful on the ground that 
any payment to the killer's wife "would likely be found to be a 
benefit to him 11 (Reasons, p. 163). 
Certainly, there is much force to the view that payments 
to Olson's wife would constitute a benefit to him. An 
underlying reason for this, not mentioned by Trainor J., is that 
Olson was, of course, subject to a legal obligation to provide 
support to his wife and child. Accordingly, payments to them 
for this purpose would partially discharge this obligation of his. 
In restitutionary terms, discharge of another's obligation is 
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normally considered to be a benefit to that other person. The 
fact that Olson has benefitted, however, should not settle the 
question of his wife's liability. The fact that he has benefitted 
might well ground a claim in restitution against him. If Mrs. 
Olson is to be required to repay the moneys received, it must 
be because she is affected by an equitable duty to restore the 
moneys which is, in a sense, derivative of the equitable duty 
that Olson himself would have had, had he received the funds. 
As a donee, indeed a donee with knowledge of the 
circumstances in which the fund was created, she could be in 
no better position in equity than her husband. Indeed, Trainor 
J. appears to appreciate this point and relies on authority for 
the proposition that in cases of equitable wrongdoing, the duty 
to restore benefits cannot be evaded by placing them in the 
hands of innocent third parties (Reasons, pp. 162-63). 
What is less certain, however, is the source of Olson's 
equitable duty to restore the fund. Although there is a 
suggestion by Trainor J. that the original transaction might be 
unconscionable, this might be a difficult point to sustain. 
Surely the equitable duty arises, if at all, because of the 
application of the wrongful killing principle and a determination 
by the Court that it is appropriate to make the remedial 
devices of equity available to the plaintiff. Once it is 
accepted that such a duty arises, the liability of Mrs. Olson 
(and other recipients of the trust moneys other than bona fide 
purchasers for value without notice) follows without difficulty. 
The creation of a trust fund, therefore, should not be 
considered an absolute bar to relief. 
It is conceivable, however, that the Courts might consider 
the creation of such funds relevant for the following reason. 
It has been argued above that in the case of investigative 
payments, at least, Courts should be reluctant to undermine 
the ability of the Crown to employ payments of this kind to 
assist investigations or prosecutions by permitting victims or 
others to recover as a general rule. It was further suggested, 
however, that there might well be some advantage to a rule 
which permitted the Courts to intervene where the amount or 
circumstances of the payment shocked the conscience of the 
Court. Presumably, the creation of a trust fund for the 
benefit of innocent third parties might be considered an 
appropriate factor to take into account in determining whether 
or not the arrangement in question does in fact shock the 
conscience of the Court. 
Are the Parents Entitled to Assert the Claim! 
Another interesting feature of the Olson decision is that 
the ultimate award was made in favour of the parents of the 
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victims. The basis for their entitlement as opposed to that of 
other conceivable claimants is not at all clear. Trainor J. 
attempted to support this aspect of his decision in the 
following manner (Reasons, p. 164): 
"The reasons underlying the establishment of the fund 
were that it would likely result in the conviction of a 
mass murderer, that it would bring to a conclusion a 
lengthy and expensive investigation, that there would be a 
lessening of public anxiety and that the finality would 
bring some solace to the parents of the murdered 
children. That describes the character of the fund and 
directs its future use." 
This is an ingenious approach to the problem of linking the 
claim of the parents to the fund. Although it is true that the 
original payment was motivated by a number of purposes, only 
one - the bringing of solace to the parents - has not yet been 
accomplished. No doubt the outrage and grief of the parents 
may well have been intensified by the establishment of the 
fund and its dismantling might well bring some small comfort. 
It must be asked, however, whether there are not other 
potential plaintiffs whose claims appear to be as strong or 
stronger than those of the parents. We will consider the 
possible claims of the Crown, the victims and other creditors. 
The Crown 
At first impression, it might appear that the Crown has a 
more compelling claim to the fund. The Crown, after all, paid 
the money into the trust. If, as is the case, the most 
compelling unjust enrichment claim arises where unjust benefit 
is found to be at the expense of the plaintiff, it is only the 
Crown that can directly link the corpus of the trust to a 
direct and precisely equivalent financial cost to itself. Perhaps 
it is not entirely clear that such a claim would lie on existing 
principles. The transaction entered into with Olson and his 
lawyers might appear to be vulnerable either on grounds of 
coercion, broadly construed, or illegality. The former seems an 
unlikely basis for setting a transaction aside. Notwithstanding 
the gradual expansion of doctrines of compulsion and 
unconscionability in Canadian law, it would be surprising if the 
Crown were to be characterized as having entered so carefully 
considered a transaction on what is essentially an involuntary 
or uninformed basis. There is obviously a strong argument to 
the effect that the agreement is unenforceable on illegality 
grounds and yet, would all agreements to pay informers be 
unenforceable on illegality grounds? If not, why would they be 
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so when entered into with a participant? This question takes 
us back to a number of the considerations already discussed 
with respect to the desirability of permitting the Crown to 
make arrangements of this kind. Nonetheless, if we assume, as 
seems likely, that such agreements would be held 
unenforceable, it is a distinct and further question whether any 
payments made by the Crown would be recoverable on 
restitutionary grounds. Unless the Crown were found to be in 
pari delicto with respect to the illegality of the transaction, 
the Crown would presumably be able to recover payments 
made. For the sake of argument, then, let us assume that the 
law enforcement agency making payments of this kind would be 
entitled to recover them. 
In Olson, of course, the R.C.M.P. chose not to seek 
recovery because "it (did) not want to appear to go back on its 
word" (Reasons, p. 161). Should the failure of the R.C.M.P. to 
assert its (perhaps higher) claim stand in the way of the lesser 
claim of .the parents? Again, we confront the question, 
considered above, of the desirability of permitting the Crown 
to make effective arrangements of this kind. It is sufficient 
at this point to note that one could defend, on policy grounds, 
a rule which prevented third parties (such as victims and their 
parents) from disrupting such arrangements but, at the same 
time, allowed the Crown to set aside such transactions and 
recover payments made. · On the other hand, if one assumes, 
as was argued above, that the Courts should exercise an 
overriding discretion to strike down arrangements which they 
find unacceptable, it may well be that the law enforcement 
agency in question will feel that it must abide by the 
arrangement and accordingly, it is not an unattractive solution 
to expose the criminal wrongdoer to the claims (and the 
underlying outrage) of the victims and their families. 
More generally, if one accepts the proposition that 
criminal wrongdoers should be deprived of incidental profits, it 
will be necessary to recognize the claims of third parties. In 
many cases, as in the case of book royalties, the supplier of 
the profit may have no claim whatsoever against the 
wrongdoer, quite apart from any inclination to enforce it. 
Moreover, it is not an unprecedented phenomenon in the 
general area of the recovery of profits of wrongdoing for 
claims to be brought by plaintiffs who cannot be said to have 
sustained a loss which is equivalent to the defendant's gain. 
This is clearly so in the context of waiver of tort and 
fiduciary duty cases {see the discussions in Goff and Jones, op. 
cit., supra, and Palmer, op. cit., supra.) Indeed, from a case 
like Reading v. A.G., [ 1951] A.C. 507, one gains the 
impression that in cases of this kind, the Courts will be rather 
creative in articulating the basis for providing a nexus between 
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a plaintiff who has suffered no loss and a defendant who has 
profitted from criminal activity. In Reading, a British non-
commissioned officer resident in Egypt who obtained moneys in 
return for providing illicit services to Egyptians who were, 
simply stated, defrauding Egyptian authorities, was required to 
disgorge his ill-gotten gains to the British Crown. 
Victims 
As has been indicated above, in the previous case-law on 
wrongful killing, the claimants have normally been the victims 
themselves or, rather, their estates. Obviously t.he victims 
have a much stronger claim than the parents, and there would 
appear to be no reason to depart from past practice in this 
regard on the facts of the Olson case. This may be viewed as 
a merely technical objection to the manner in which the Olson 
claim has been pleaded, inasmuch as it seems likely that many 
of the victims would not have testamentary capacity and, in 
any event, claims on behalf of the children could appropriately 
be brought by the parents with the ultimate result that 
recovery would enure to the benefit of the parents. 
Nonetheless, as between the parents and the victims, it would 
seem that the latter have the stronger claim and, indeed, if 
the victims or their representatives did not wish to pursue a 
particular claim, it is not at all obvious that the parents 
should be entitled to pursue independent relief. 
Other Creditors 
The effect of imposing a constructive trust on the 
defendents is, of course, to create a priority for the plaintiff 
class. This appears not to have been clearly understood by 
Trainor J. inasmuch as the penultimate paragraph in his 
judgment seems to suggest that it might be possible for other 
claimants to come forward and assert rights against the 
recaptured trust fund. One possible claim to bring against the 
defendants in Olson would have been a creditors' suit, in which 
the plaintiffs would attempt to recover assets of the debtor, 
i.e. Olson, and restore them to the debtor so that they are 
available not only to the plaintiff creditors but to creditors as 
a class more generally. For a brief discussion of creditors' 
suits, see J.D. McCamus, "The Self-Serving Intermeddler and 
the Law of Restitution" (1978), 16 Osgoode Hall L.J. 515. In 
such a case, other creditors would indeed share the bounty. 
Those who did so could be required to bear a portion of the 
cost of the original litigation. This was not, however, the 
nature of the claim brought in the Olson case. The parents 
sought to assert a theory of obligation giving rise to the 
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constructive trust which, again, would create a priority for 
them over other creditors. 
The remaining question, then, is whether a basis for such 
a priority can be successfully articulated. The decision in 
Schobelt v. Barber does not offer direct assistance. Perhaps 
the imposition of the constructive trust on the Schobelt facts 
rests, in part at least, <;m the fact that the profit acquired by 
the criminal is proprietary in nature. It may well be that the 
reason for giving what is, in effect, a priority to the victim's 
estate in these cases rests also on a belief that the injury of 
the victim and his or her devisees is rather different from the 
losses of the general run of creditors and ought to be given 
more favourable treatment. Certainly, if the priority affected 
by the constructive trust remedy is to be utilized in this 
context, its justification must rest on considerations of this 
kind. 
Conclusion 
The problems inherent in the claim brought by the 
parents in the Olson case are as intriguing as the solutions 
proposed by Trainor J. in his reasons for judgment. It has 
been argued above that recovery of what have been referred to 
here as indirect profits of wrongful killing should be potentially 
recoverable as a matter of general principle. As well, it has 
been argued that in the case of both payments of the kind 
made in the Olson case and other kinds of indirect profits such 
as royalties from book publishing, there are serious 
considerations weighing against a principle which would allow 
recovery of all such profits. Finally, it has been suggested 
that either or both of the victims themselves or the R.C.M.P. 
would appear to be more suitable plaintiffs than the parents of 
the victim, although it was further suggested that on the 
particular facts of the Olson case this might be considered to 
be an objection of a rather technical and unmeritorious nature 
as far as the standing of the parents is concerned. 
No doubt some observers will see the decision in Olson as 
further support for the proposition that "hard cases make bad 
law". Another view is possible, however, as I have attempted 
to demonstrate. It may well be that the Olson decision will 
be seen to have opened a new and very interesting chapter in 
the long history of the evolution of the wrongful killing 
principle. 
